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Abstract 
In its Final Modification for Reviews the U.S. DOC announced on February 14, 2012 that it would 
cease the use of zeroing in the calculation of anti-dumping (AD) margins in all reviews as of April 16, 
2012. However, it did not pertain to targeted dumping. In its Final Rule of April 22, 2014, it codified 
substantial discretion in calculating AD duties, including the use of zeroing, in targeted dumping. Thus 
the panel in Shrimp II erred in not finding “as such” inconsistency by the U.S. with the AD 
Agreement, despite this not being a targeted dumping complaint. Given the record of the U.S. in 
complying with zeroing petitions, it should have incurred the burden of proof, which is not satisfied by 
these pronouncements. Market structure should be used by panels in “as applied” inconsistency 
determinations. Viet Nam should have included an Art. 3 violation in its complaint. 
Keywords 
Zeroing, Anti-Dumping, Targeted Dumping, Final Modification/ Final Rule, Non-Market Entity. 
 1 
1. Introduction* 
As there have been several analyses of Panel and Appellate Body (AB) reports of simple and model 
zeroing
1
 in antidumping (AD) investigations (Bown and Sykes 2008, Hoekman and Wauters 2011, 
Prusa and Vermulst 2011, Broude and Moore 2013, Prusa and Roubini 2013, Saggi and Wu 2013, and 
Ahn and Messerlin 2014),
2
 it would be tempting to dismiss another panel report on this topic as having 
nothing novel of legal and economic interest
3
. However, there are three novel legal issues in DS429 
US-Certain Frozen Warmwater Shrimp (Viet Nam), for which a request for consultations was filed on 
February 16, 2012. The first and second issues are not significant in effect for the implementation of 
the panel’s decisions in DS429. Rather, they are portentous for the future use of zeroing in AD 
investigations, particularly by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). 
One pertains to the announcement by the DOC on February 14, 2012 of its Final Modification for 
Reviews in which it stated that it would cease the use of zeroing in the calculation of AD margins in 
administrative reviews, new shipper reviews, and expedited AD reviews as of April 16, 2012
4
. 
Although the preliminary results for the sixth administrative review were issued on March 7, 2012
5
, it 
is noteworthy that the DOC did not apply the Final Modification in this review, as the final report of 
the sixth administrative review was released after the date of application of the Final Modification 
(That is, the final report was released on September 11, 2012)
6
. Although the review was in process 
when the Final Modification became applicable, this would have been an opportunity for the DOC to 
dispel doubt that it was serious about reforming its policy. 
The second is the Final Rule issued by the DOC on April 22, 2014
7
. It addresses the matter of 
determination of AD margins in instances of targeted dumping. Essentially, it is a waiver of some 
provisions of the Final Modification. I will discuss the importance of the Final Rule and its nexus with 
the Final Modification below. 
It is important to underscore that DS429 is not a targeted dumping dispute. Targeted dumping 
never was alleged by the DOC. The panel, however, stated that “Viet Nam’s arguments fail to 
appreciate the significance of the Final Modification for its assertion that the zeroing methodology is a 
measure of general and prospective application”. Thus the panel gave substantial weight to this 
document in its rejection of Viet Nam’s “as such” claim. My view is that the panel failed to appreciate 
the significance of the opening the DOC gave itself through the Final Modification for continued use 
of zeroing in instances where targeted dumping is alleged. The burden of proof that zeroing was 
discontinued by publication of the Final Modification should have resided with the U.S. Given the 
record of the U.S. in responding to preceding determinations by panels regarding zeroing, my view is 
                                                     
*
 Valuable comments were received from Chad Bown, Bill Davey, Jennifer Hillman, Rob Howse, Petros Mavroidis, Tom 
Prusa, and participants at the 2015 WTO Case Law Project Conference at EUI in Florence, Italy. They are not to be 
implicated. 
1
 Zeroing refers to the calculation of AD margins in which instances of an export price of a good exceeding the price of 
like product sold in the domestic market is not allowed to negate occurrences of the export price being exceeded by the 
price of like product in the domestic market. It is often termed the A-T or average to transaction method. 
2
 While not an analysis of a specific dispute, Bown and Prusa (2011) provide an informative assessment of the use of 
zeroing by the DOC in general. 
3
 This presumption would be due in no small part to Broude and Moore having provided an insightful analysis of the panel 
report for DS404 US-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp (Viet Nam). 
4
 77 Federal Register 8101. 
5
 77 Federal Register 13547 
6
 77 Federal Register 55800 
7
 79 Federal Register 22371. 
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that the U.S. failed to satisfy this burden. Subsequent publication of the Final Rule affirms the concern 
that the panel missed an opportunity to sustain the pressure on the DOC to discontinue this method of 
calculating AD margins. Thus one importance of DS429 is its implication for the plausible 
proliferation of targeted dumping allegations in AD investigations by the DOC. 
Thus my view is that the panel erred in its determination that Viet Nam failed to establish that the 
DOC’s simple zeroing method was “as such” inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement (ADA) and Article VI:2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. In 
reaching this determination, I consider the record of the U.S. in being the respondent in prior zeroing 
disputes, the incrementalism of U.S. compliance with previous zeroing verdicts in which it was found 
to be inconsistent with the ADA (Saggi and Wu), the text of the Final Modification, and the text of the 
Final Rule. In particular, I believe that the texts do not provide sufficient disciplines regarding use of 
zeroing in future AD investigations.  
The third issue is the failure of the panel to invoke the opportunity to consider market structure in 
assessing the consistency of the actions by the U.S. with regard to its obligations under Articles 6.10 
and 9.2 of the ADA. This pertains to the presumption by the DOC that all “producers/ exporters” in a 
non-market economy (NME) belong to a single entity, and the assignment of a single AD margin to 
each of these firms. I concur with the judgment of the panel of “as such” inconsistency. However, the 
panel could have made its determination much more emphatic through invocation and analysis of the 
structure of the market for production of frozen warmwater shrimp.  
The preceding analyses of panel and AB reports regarding zeroing has not explored the context of 
market structure in assessing the reasonableness of the DOC’s calculation of AD margins. The shrimp 
industry provides a valuable vehicle for doing so. It is about as close to the theoretical construct of 
perfect competition as one can get. I will contend that the NME entity rate’s appropriateness “as such” 
or “as applied” can be inferred readily through the prism of market structure.  
In my discussion of market structure in the context of the particulars of the warmwater shrimp 
industry, I contend that the greater production volatility of the wild-caught domestic production 
arguably is a more important source of the seasonably low domestic prices than the less volatile 
(farmed) imports. That the original investigation did not disentangle the relative importance of 
domestic and imported sources of injurious pricing could have been a basis for complaint by Viet Nam 
of an Art. 3 violation of the ADA on the part of the U.S. 
I will segue into a discussion of whether or not the petition by the U.S. industry should have been 
filed under the ADA, while being mindful that it would not have been appropriate for the panel to 
entertain it. In particular, I will contend that the evidence in the petition and the recent evolution of the 
U.S. shrimp industry are more supportive of filing under the Agreement on Safeguards (ASG). Given 
the magnitude of the AD margins computed for the NME entity by the DOC for an approximately 
perfectly competitive industry, I will consider whether or not a petition under the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCVM) may have been more defensible. Ultimately, I will 
contend that the U.S. government may have missed an opportunity to provide greater protection to its 
shrimp industry under the Sanitary and PhytoSanitary Agreement (SPS), as a matter of food safety 
could have been alleged.  
2. What Did the Panel Address? 
The salient issues, in my view, that the panel addressed begin with the inconsistency (as such and as 
applied) with Art 9.3 of the ADA and Art VI: 2 of the GATT. This restricts the amount of the AD to 
being less than or equal to the dumping margin.  
Secondly, Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the ADA are considered. Art. 6.10 concerns appropriate 
notification of interested parties, including the opportunity to respond under assurance of 
It’s baaaack— zeroing, the US Department of Commerce, and US — Shrimp II (Viet Nam) 
3 
confidentiality. Art. 9.2 stipulates non-discriminatory collection of duties in appropriate amounts. A 
specific concern is the rebuttable proposition under U.S. law in which all companies in a NME are 
presumed to belong to a single entity. 
The panel also revisited the decision of the panel in DS404 regarding Art. 6.8 and Annex II(1)of 
the ADA. This pertains to the use of facts available (FA) when an “interested party” declines to 
provide “necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation”. 
The panel also considered claims under Art. 9.4, Art. 11.1, Art. 11.2, Art. 11.3, and Art. 18.1 of the 
ADA. Additionally, claims under Art. 3.8 and Art. 19.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding were 
addressed. Section 129 (c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of the U.S. in 1994 also was 
considered. These either were discussed thoroughly by Broude and Moore, or I have nothing of 
interest to introduce. 
3. A Few Pertinent Facts 
The original investigation named Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam as producers 
of subject merchandise, and commenced on December 31, 2003. The final report of the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (USITC) was issued in January of 2005
8
. The USITC determined that 
approximately 95 percent of U.S. production was wild-caught and the remainder was farmed. That 
farming was not used more extensively in the U.S. was reported to be due to a less suitable climate, 
higher prices of coastal land, and more restrictive environmental regulations than in the named 
countries. The harvesting season extended from May to December in the U.S. 
There were 125 firms identified as domestic processors of shrimp, and 190 firms reported to be 
shrimp fisherman. Fresh, frozen, and canned warmwater shrimp were deemed to constitute the 
domestic industry. That is, the interests of the fisherman and the processors were coincident. There 
were 36 purchasers of processed warmwater shrimp identified in the U.S. market. Thus there was no 
monopsony power amongst buyers. 
There were 10 product categories identified in the investigation. Subject imports appeared to be 
differentiated primarily by processing (canned or frozen) and size. Within each category, the good 
appeared to be approximately homogeneous
9
. 
Thirteen processing firms were identified in Brazil, 28 firms were revealed in China, 9 firms were 
disclosed in Ecuador, 83 were identified in India, 37 were found in Thailand, and 36 firms were 
identified in Viet Nam. These constituted from 46.7 percent of exports to the U.S. in Brazil to 97.1 
percent in Viet Nam. Unlike the U.S. industry, the “vast” majority of subject imports was farmed. The 
production of aquaculture was deemed to be “less seasonal”, and to have a longer harvest period. 
While the harvest seasons in the named countries were not coincident, the USITC reported that an 
imported product category was generally available from a named source at all times. 
                                                     
8
 Certain Frozen or Canned Warmwater Shrimp and Prawns from Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand , and Viet Nam, 
U.S. International Trade Commission Publication 3748 January 2005. 
9
 I am aware that Chad Bown supplied statistical analysis to the USITC during its material injury investigation which 
indicated that wild-caught and farmed shrimp are heterogeneous goods, the basis for which is superior flavor of the wild-
caught variety. While this may be true, Jennifer Hillman has suggested that the domestic industry has not pursued the 
marketing of their product as having superior flavor and texture. Rob Howse has suggested that the actual market 
distinction can be based upon either of two standards. One is how a rational perfectly informed consumer would view 
wild-caught versus farmed production. The other is how an actual consumer would view output of the two production 
methods. Given that domestic producers have not marketed their product as superior, the standard of an actual consumer 
seems appropriate. 
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4. Final Modification for Reviews and the Final Rule 
Because of the publication of the Final Modification, the panel found that Viet Nam had failed to 
establish that the use of zeroing by the DOC was “as such” inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the ADA 
and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. The legal standard for an “as such” determination is “a measure 
of general and prospective application”. This is irrespective of practice, as there cannot be a 
circumstance in which the policy is not implemented. The panel appeared to believe that disuse of 
zeroing would become the “general and prospective application”. 
In the Final Modification, the DOC refers to retaining “considerable discretion in selecting an 
appropriate comparison methodology in reviews”. It also states that ‘It is not necessary, appropriate, or 
desirable” to adopt a “total prohibition of zeroing”, as the Final Modification satisfies “the WTO 
settlement reports at issue”. This seems eerily similar to the incrementalism of the compliance by the 
U.S. in the litany of disputes in which it has been a respondent. Importantly, the Final Modification 
discloses that the DOC “will continue to work closely and actively with USTR with a view towards 
clarifying that the AD Agreement should not be read to require WTO members to provide offsets for 
non-dumped comparisons”. There is no surrender here.  
In response to a request to include regulation of targeted dumping in the Final Modification, the 
DOC dismissed it as being “unrelated”10. This view was reiterated in the Final Rule issued by the 
DOC on April 22, 2014
11
. Under this Rule, targeted dumping, which is defined as exhibiting a pattern 
of significant differences in export prices among purchasers, regions, or time periods, permits use of 
zeroing
12
. In its justification for this Rule, the DOC refers to the need for “discretion”, the benefits to 
“refinement” of its approach through “experience”, and the necessity of “improving its ability to 
identify and address masked dumping”. 
This is worrisome, as Ahn and Messerlin have noted that the DOC recently has utilized targeted 
dumping in investigations against ”Bottom Mount Combination Refrigerator-Freezers” from Korea13 
(final determination on March 26, 2012), and against “Large Residential Washers” from Korea14 (final 
determination on December 26, 2012). Thus I concur with Ahn and Messerlin that the definition of 
targeted dumping lacks discipline, and add that so does “necessary”, “appropriate”, and “desirable”.  
That the panel did agree with Viet Nam that the use of zeroing by the DOC was “as applied” 
inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the ADA and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 is of limited consolation. 
While disagreeing with the “as such” allegation may not be of operational significance in the context 
of this dispute, it is of substantial significance with regard to the deterrence of future use of this 
method of computing AD margins. Thus the panel left the DOC with too much room to breathe.  
5. What Can Economics Contribute? 
Although there is no statutory requirement in the ADA to determine the reason(s) a firm may have 
engaged in third degree price discrimination
15
 or may have charged a price below that of unit costs, it 
is instructive to consider this in the context of the reasonableness of the DOC’s AD margins. 
                                                     
10
 77 Federal Register 8101. 
11
 79 Federal Register 22371 
12
 ADA Article 2.4.2 
13
 77 Federal Register 17413 
14
 77 Federal Register 75988 
15
 Third degree price discrimination refers to charging different prices in segmented markets based upon differences in the 
own price elasticity of demand in these markets. Segmentation precludes (complete) arbitrage. 
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Given that the shrimp market is approximately perfectly competitive, third degree price 
discrimination (Viner 1923), is not relevant. This requires imperfectly own price elastic demand 
functions that are reflective of market power, which is arguably absent in this industry. The reciprocal 
dumping explanation of Brander and Krugman (1983) requires international shipping costs and 
strategic interaction (oligopoly) of firms. It results in an export price net of production and 
international shipping costs that is below the domestic market price net of production costs. This is not 
relevant here.  
Predatory dumping (Bernhofen 1996, Hartigan 1994, 1996) requires high entry and re-entry costs. 
This may provide a foreign firm with an incentive to set a price below the unit costs of domestic 
competitors so that a monopoly can be established. It requires a firm that can absorb a temporary 
sacrifice of profits, and is not relevant here either. 
In the presence of cyclical demand, excess capacity, and high fixed costs as a percent of total 
production costs, a firm may engage in episodic dumping to manage a recession in its (primary) 
domestic market (Ethier 1982, Staiger and Wolak 1992). As the USITC reports, capacity utilization 
for the period of investigation (January 2001-June 2004) averaged around 90 percent. The exports of 
shrimp constituted about 85 percent of total shipments of the foreign producers. Thus this does not 
appear to provide the motive for dumping.  
It is plausible that a firm would introduce an experience good to a new market through a low initial 
offer (Bagwell and Staiger 1989)
16
. The low introductory offer would provide an inducement to 
consumers to try a product in lieu of others with established (positive) reputations. It doesn’t seem to 
work with shrimp. 
The explanation of dumping in agricultural and aquacultural markets by Hartigan (2000) seems 
instructive. This entails a perfectly competitive market in which expected profits over the course of a 
growing and harvesting period are zero. Actual profits could be positive or negative in the presence of 
an adverse or beneficial stochastic (probabilistic) shock. Firms contract with itinerant labor at the 
beginning of the planting season, so that all inputs essentially are fixed for the current season. Since 
variable costs would be very low, it would be rational to sell at a low price
17
. Production is zero when 
out of season. Production is also zero in the growing season
18
. During the harvest season, production 
gradually increases, reaches a peak, and gradually declines. If profits are to be expected to be zero 
over the harvest and demand was constant, a loss would incur at peak harvest due to higher supply 
relative to demand inducing lower prices.  
The average-to-transaction (A-T) method of calculating AD margins is particularly destructive in 
this context. Under this method, a weighted average of the normal value of foreign market prices is 
compared to individual export prices. As prices vary over the course of a harvest, this method 
inevitably yields dumping, and may produce high margins. This is a distinctive aspect of agricultural 
and aquacultural markets. 
Article 2.2.1 of the ADA stipulates that prices below unit costs should “provide for the recovery of 
all costs with a reasonable period of time”. This article defines the “ordinary course of trade” to be 
from 6 to 12 months. Even if the A-T method is eschewed, dumping can be found if a stochastic shock 
generates ex post losses despite the expectation of zero profits. The recovery of the losses would not 
be plausible until the harvest of the succeeding year. Art. 2.2.1 provides that sales made below the unit 
                                                     
16
 An experience good is one for which, above some threshold, quality cannot be ascertained prior to purchase. This would 
pertain to, say, autos and consumer electronics. Although the explanation certainly would apply to dumping, Bagwell and 
Staiger consider an export subsidy. 
17
 A firm will sell at a loss as long as total revenue is at least as great as total variable costs. 
18
 This is most pertinent for goods that are not storable. If they can be stored, or harvesting can be delayed for further 
growth, this characterization is somewhat restrictive. Aquaculture might be more amenable to delayed harvesting than 
agriculture. 
James C. Hartigan 
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cost of production (fixed and variable) plus average selling, general, and administrative expenses 
(SG&A) may, under certain circumstances, be considered “as sales that are not in the ordinary course 
of trade”. 
This holds only if sales had been made “within an extended period of time” (normally one year, but 
in no case less than six months), “ in substantial quantities” (if the weighted average of selling prices 
of the transactions under consideration is below the weighted average of per unit costs, or if the 
volume of sales at a loss represents at least 20 per cent of the volume of transactions), and “at prices 
which do not allow for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time”. Sales made at 
prices that are below per unit costs at the time of sale, but above the weighted average per unit costs 
for the period of investigation, shall be taken into account as means for the “recovery of costs within a 
reasonable period of time”. 
The wording of Art. 2.2.1 ADA does not suggest that what is described above is the only case of 
sales that are not encompassed by the ordinary course of trade. Case law has provided additional 
examples of sales outside the ordinary course of trade
19
. 
Must trade that is unfair be a matter of volition? Article 2.1 of the ADA refers the introduction 
“into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value”. Article 8 of the ADA addresses 
the matter of price undertakings which permits suspension or termination of an investigation upon 
receipt of “satisfactory” assurances from “any exporter” that export prices have been revised to 
eliminate injurious effect to the domestic industry. However, Article 8.3 states that undertakings “need 
not be accepted”, such as when “the number of actual or potential exporters is too great”. This 
suggests that the prices of exports that ostensibly are a cause of injury to the domestic industry can be 
a matter of competitive pressures, and do not have to be intentionally unfair to qualify as dumping. If 
an exporter cannot commit to an undertaking because of competition, it is arguable that its “dumping” 
is a response to that competition. Nonetheless the seasonality of prices exhibited in an agricultural or 
aquacultural market should be regarded as normal and unintentional. Unless a harvest is unusually 
bountiful, resulting in prices that are below the norm, dumping should not have been deemed to have 
occurred from mere seasonality.  
Because of the prevalence of aquaculture in the named exporting countries, and its limited profile 
in the U.S., the seasonality of production and attendant decline in prices, to the extent that it existed, 
was caused more plausibly by U.S. wild-caught production. Although the prices at peak harvest might 
benefit the domestic processors at the expense of domestic fisherman, higher prices at other phases of 
the production cycle would be to their detriment. Since fisherman sell to local processors, direct 
competition is between the U.S. processing industry and those of the named countries. Consistent with 
Hartigan (2000), the USITC reports that U.S. processors historically have retained frozen supply for 
sale during the January to April non-fishing season at higher prices. However, the presence of farmed 
imported shrimp during this period has mitigated the value of their inventories. Nonetheless, the 
presence of imports, fairly or allegedly unfairly traded, would have this effect. 
In accordance with Art. 3.1 of the ADA, the material injury must arise in the domestic market
20
. 
That is, it must be incurred by domestic producers of subject merchandise. Art. 3.2 references a 
                                                     
19
 In US—Hot-Rolled Steel, sales between parties with common ownership were identified by the AB as a case of sales 
outside the ordinary course of trade, but the AB determined that, even where the parties were entirely independent, a 
transaction might still not be in the ordinary course of trade, citing as example a liquidation sale by an enterprise to an 
independent buyer, which may not reflect normal commercial principles. The AB further held in the same case that 
investigative authorities cannot cherry-pick among sales between related parties. That is, they cannot make the facts fit 
their judgment. A test applied by the US, which excluded sales transactions between related parties that were marginally 
low-priced while including all high-priced sales with the exception those proven to be aberrantly high-priced, ran, in the 
AB’s view, afoul Art. 2.2.1 AD. I appreciate Petros Mavroidis for providing me with the material pertaining to “the 
ordinary course of trade”. 
20
 I am grateful to Jennifer Hillman for suggesting that I consider consistency with Art. 3. 
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“significant increase in dumped imports”, which can be measured absolutely or relatively. Art. 3.5 
requires “a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry”. If 
the wild-caught harvest of the U.S. industry exhibited greater seasonality than imported production, 
and this was the source of the decline in domestic prices over which (perfectly competitive) firms have 
no discretion, it is arguable that a basis of Viet Nam’s complaint should have included an Art. 3 
violation by the U.S. 
6. Is Market Structure an Available Fact? 
The U.S. conducts AD investigations in accordance with Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930. This act 
permits the characterization of economies as market or NMEs by U.S. investigative authorities. It is 
not part of GATT VI or the ADA. It is U.S. practice. 
The prices in NMEs are deemed to be unreflective of scarcity, and hence, fair value. The DOC’s 
investigators are directed to utilize cost and price data from third countries in this instance. The DOC 
begins with a rebuttable proposition that all firms in a NME will receive the same economy wide rate 
(EWR). Firms may qualify for a separate rate (SR) if they can establish to the satisfaction of the DOC 
that they are sufficiently independent of the government in exporting.  
This matter arose in DS404 (Shrimp I), and has been detailed and addressed compellingly by 
Broude and Moore with regard to sampling. However, given our introduction of market structure to 
the discussion, we have a few additional points to include. 
The panel asserted that Viet Nam objected to the rebuttable proposition that in a NME all 
companies belong to a single entity. In this instance, the presumption must be disproven to the 
satisfaction of the DOC. Viet Nam also contested the manner by which the AD margins were 
computed, particularly the use of facts available (FA). The panel concurred with Viet Nam that the 
rebuttable proposition could be challenged “as such”. However, it did not agree that the existence of a 
DOC practice for the calculation of AD margins for NMEs was established that was subject to an “as 
such” challenge.  
The panel did conclude that the NME-wide entity rate practice could be challenged “as such” for 
inconsistency specifically with regard to Articles 6.10 and 9.2 of the ADA as a matter of general and 
prospective application. In making this determination, the panel refers to the presumption of a single 
NME-wide entity. Would this conclusion have been reached in the absence of the presumption? That 
is, on the basis of the use of FA alone? Plausibly not. There has to be some method of calculating 
margins in instances of non-cooperation by named firms and/ or the submission of inadequate data. 
Use of such a method is sanctioned by Art. 6.8 of the ADA. However, the presumption is not. This 
method or methods may not have supported a conclusion that all exporters warranted the same AD 
margin in the absence of the rebuttable presumption. 
So is market structure an available fact? Well no, not really. However, we contend that it may be 
discernible from the facts of the case, and if so, should be utilized in assessment of the reasonableness 
of actions by an investigative authority. For example, the investigation will disclose the number of 
firms producing the named product, the existence of brands and warranties, and the extent of 
homogeneity of the subject good. The investigative reports of the USITC, for example, include results 
of a survey of purchasers of the subject import with regard to the importance of such matters as price, 
quality, interchangeability, safety, and availability. These are indicators of market structure. 
Consider the EWR of 25.6 percent. This was established in the original investigation and has 
persisted through 6 administrative reviews. Given that the market is approximately perfectly 
competitive, it has to be prohibitive. It is not conceivable that the firms saddled with this impediment 
could compete in the U.S. market. Indeed, even the 4.57 percent weighted average AD margin for 
mandatory respondents in the original investigation and the first three administrative reviews, and the 
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3.92 percent margin of the fourth administrative review are plausibly prohibitive in an approximately 
perfectly competitive market. That is, where goods are approximately homogeneous. While these 
separate rates (SR) may or may not be prohibitive, the EWR certainly is. This underscores the 
importance of the “individual margin” referenced in article 6.10, subject to the “impracticable” 
constraint. The reference to “appropriate amounts” in Art. 9.2 is delimiting of the discretion of the 
DOC. It evidently is not a sufficient delimiter, as investigative authorities retain substantial discretion. 
I concur with the panel’s finding of “as such” inconsistency with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 in the 
assignment of a single rate to all exporters of a NME under the presumption that all companies are 
members of a NME-wide entity. Moreover, I have provided additional justification for an “as applied” 
determination of inconsistency. In this complaint, and in possible future complaints involving a large 
number of exporters of a reasonably homogeneous good, I recommend that an “as applied” 
determination take market structure into account. It may, as a matter of policy, be an important 
distinction between agricultural (including aquacultural) and industrial production
21
. It is important, 
however, to be mindful of the extraordinary discretion that the ADA grants investigative authorities.  
Of course, as market structure is contextual, this does not inform “as such” judgments. As the panel 
asserted that its conclusions with regard to “as such” inconsistency with Articles 6.10 and 9.2 “are 
applicable mutatis mutandis” to a consideration of an “as applied” allegation of inconsistency, one 
might wonder why we address this determination. My concern is prospective. Suppose that the U.S. 
withdrew its presumption, or that all of the sources of its exports became market economies, as Viet 
Nam is doing. There may be future complaints for which an “as applied” determination is relevant but 
an “as such” verdict is not. Thus my discussion. 
Is there a basis within the ADA for asserting that a panel could determine inconsistency of an 
investigation or review for not assessing the influence of market structure upon pricing and its effects? 
It does not state so explicitly, but the inference is supportable by its text. Article 2.2 refers to the 
“ordinary course of trade”. It is plausible that the “ordinary course of trade” cannot be ascertained 
without consideration of market structure. Article 3.4 references “all relevant economic factors and 
indices having a bearing upon the state of the industry”. This should include market structure. Article 
3.5 mentions “competition between domestic and foreign producers”. This occurs in the context of a 
market structure
22
.  
The panels for Shrimp I (DS404) and Shrimp II (DS429) disagreed regarding interpretations of 
Article 6.8 of the ADA. This pertains to the use of FA in when “necessary information” is not 
provided “within a reasonable period” or the investigation is “significantly” impeded by “any 
interested party”. The panel for this dispute concluded, that because the DOC applied the NME-wide 
rate computed in the original investigation to that entity in all 6 subsequent administrative reviews, it 
did not make any determination in reviews 4, 5, and 6, which were at issue in DS429. That is, FA were 
not invoked. The panel for DS404 concluded that “to fail to treat this rate as a facts available rate 
would elevate form over substance, and ignore the true factual circumstances surrounding the 
assignment of the rate” for the earlier administrative reviews. I concur with the panel for Shrimp I and 
disagree with the panel for Shrimp II. Deciding to utilize a rate from a preceding investigation is, in 
fact, a determination. What’s more, it is more consistent with an objective of the promotion of trade 
and stare decisis
23
, and leaves the beast with room to breathe. 
                                                     
21
 The DOC has been more tolerant of sales at a loss in the domestic market of the exporting country in the calculation of 
normal value for agricultural goods than it has been for industrial goods. This entails the possibility of permitting a higher 
percentage of sales at a loss, dependent upon perishability and the extent of control that a grower exercises over the 
timing of harvest (Hartigan 2000). 
22
 Recall my discussion of “ordinary course of trade” in section 3.  
23
 I recognize that, while desirable in the absence of errors, precedent is not binding.  
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7. Is This an AD Case? 
Although it would have been inappropriate for the panel to have considered whether or not an AD 
action was the proper venue for redress of the U.S. shrimp industry’s viability, it is instructive to 
speculate about the matter. However, the domain of the panel’s analysis is the specific issues alleged 
by the complainant. 
The U.S. shrimp industry, at its discretion, could have filed a petition under Section 201 of the 
Tariff Act of 1974 instead of Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930. That is, it could have filed a 
safeguards (SG) petition rather than an AD complaint. The lesser injury standard (material vs. 
serious)
24
, the involvement of a sympathetic DOC, the absence of a provision for an allegation of 
nullification and impairment of expected benefits (compensation or retaliation), and the absence of a 
presidential decision may have been good reasons to file an AD petition
25
.  
Consider, however, the purpose of SG. It is, plausibly, either of two objectives. One is to facilitate 
orderly exit from the production of subject merchandise. This would include reducing employment by 
attrition through extending the cessation of production over a longer period of time. The other is to 
facilitate restructuring. This would include plant closure, bankruptcy, and investment in new 
equipment (Bown 2002, Sykes 2006, Hartigan 2015).  
Recall the discussion of the domestic industry in Section 2 above. At the time of the original 
investigation, the U.S. shrimp was 95 percent wild-caught, and the “vast majority” of subject imports 
was characterized as produced through aquaculture. Farming appeared to modulate seasonality and 
provide more consistent size and quality of harvest
26
. That the U.S. did not implement aquaculture to a 
greater extent was reputedly due to coastal land prices, climate, and environmental regulations. This 
appears to epitomize the need for orderly exit. Thus SG measures seemingly would have been more 
appropriate than AD duties. The facts did not portend a future globally competitive U.S. shrimp 
industry.  
However, this is changing, and in a way that underscores the appropriateness of SG as the petition 
that should have been filed. On July 2, 2014, the New York Times published an article about the 
emergence of the indoor shrimp aquacultural industry in the U.S
27
. This evolving and innovative 
industry uses “fiberglass tanks fitted with advanced recirculation, filtration, and temperature control 
systems”. It relies upon tanks of sea water from the Atlantic Ocean. This water is “filtered and reused 
from harvest to harvest”. It does not utilize antibiotics, hormones, or pesticides. In the five years 
leading to the article, the number of such farms has increased from 2 to at least 22 in the U.S. This 
suggests that the advantage in technology of the U.S. may overcome its disadvantage in labor costs, 
land prices, and regulatory requirements in sustaining a viable domestic industry. It would appear that 
there would be some churning, however, as the emerging businesses may differ in ownership and 
location from those that are contracting. This is a natural evolution of a market that arguably does not 
have much to do with dumping, but its adjustment costs may be mitigated by SG. 
Given the magnitude of the AD margins for NME-wide entity in the context of an approximately 
perfectly competitive market, I infer that an AD margin of 25.6 is indicative of sales at a loss or cost 
dumping. That is, unless the NME entity was being subsidized. In such an instance, a petition under 
the ASCVM agreement would have been more appropriate, and these margins more defensible. 
However, a subsidy in a NME may not be countervailable, as there isn’t any market to distort28. As 
Feldman and Burke (2013) discuss, the U.S. began to initiate AD and countervailing duty 
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 See the texts of the ASG and ADA at www.wto.org. 
25
 See Hartigan and Vandenbussche (2013). 
26
 USITC op cit. 
27
 www.nytimes.com/2014/july-2 
28
 63 Federal Register 65348, 65360 
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investigations simultaneously against China in 2006, generating legal controversy at the U.S. Court of 
International Trade and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Ramanujian and Sampath 
(2015) critique panel and AB reports over this pairing of measures. Thus a SG petition arguably was 
more appropriate than one alleging subsidization
29
.  
In discussing the advantages of the new techniques of aquaculture, I note the absence of hormones, 
antibiotics, and pesticides. This segues into a discussion of food safety and the SPS Agreement. I note, 
in this regard, that the USITC report for the original investigation refers to the use of antibiotics in 
shrimp farming. That report also mentions that less than 2 percent of imports are inspected by the 
Federal Drug Administration (FDA), while domestic production is subject to “multiple U.S. 
government regulations”. This includes state boards of health and the Hazardous Analysis Critical 
Control Points (HACCP). The USITC report contains allegations of U.S. processors that the 
regulations are “effectively different” for U.S. and imported production. In addition to the 
investigation, there are other reports of concern in the EU, Japan, and the U.S. over the use of 
antibiotics, disinfectants, and pesticides in shrimp farming in developing countries
30
. 
This would appear to be a matter for Article XX(b) of the GATT and the SPS agreement. Article 1 
establishes the domain of the Agreement as SPS measures that “may, directly or indirectly, affect 
international trade”. Article 2(1) of the SPS refers to a right to protect “human, animal, or plant life or 
health”. Article 2(2) states that such protection should only be “to the extent necessary”. The chapeau 
of the SPS Agreement, Articles 5, 9, and 10, and Annexes A, B, and C refer to “appropriate” levels of 
protection. Implementing increased inspection of imported shrimp plausibly could protect the 
domestic industry by introducing or raising compliance costs of foreign producers, thereby inducing 
higher domestic prices through reduced foreign supply. While AD duties impose a pure surplus loss 
upon domestic consumers, an SPS measure would provide them a benefit for the higher prices. This 
arguably would be a safer product and/ or more confidence in the product’s safety. The negative 
implication is that invocation of SPS in such an instance would be an example of what Bhagwati 
(1988) has termed the “law of constant protectionism”. That is, curtailment of one instrument for 
protecting a domestic industry induces the emergence of an alternative measure. 
8. Conclusion  
US - Shrimp II (Viet Nam) should not be viewed as just another zeroing case without anything to add 
to the critiques of previous panels. There were two pronouncements by the DOC for which Shrimp II 
was the first relevant dispute. The initial one was the Final Modification for Reviews in February 2012 
in which the DOC appeared to concede that its campaign to legitimize the use of zeroing in the 
calculation of margins had failed. The Final Modification was released two days prior to the request 
for consultations by Viet Nam
31
. However, a mere two years later, in April of 2014, the DOC was 
back. This time it released its Final Rule for the calculation of AD margins in instances of targeted 
dumping. It asserted substantial discretion in making such computations. Since targeted dumping was 
claimed as an exception in the renouncement of zeroing in the Final Modification, the DOC appears to 
be reverting to its discredited ways. Thus the panel, in my view, not only missed an opportunity to 
continue to apply pressure on the DOC, it also appeared to be endorsing its interpretation. 
I also discuss dumping in the context of an approximately perfectly competitive market which 
exhibits seasonality in production. I suggest that it may not have been appropriate to have 
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 Beshkar and Chilton (2016) is also relevant. 
30
 See, for example, www.foodandwaterwatch.org/reports/suspicious-shrimp. 
31
 Although the sixth administrative review, a subject of contention in this dispute, was in process at the time that the Final 
Modification was announced and the nearly simultaneous request for consultations occurred, it is arguable that these 
consultations could have mitigated the disagreement if the DOC was sufficiently flexible to implement in the ongoing 
sixth review what it stated it was committed to begin doing in the near future. 
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characterized the pricing behavior in the U.S. frozen shrimp market as dumping. Indeed, it is arguable 
that Viet Nam should have included an allegation of an Art. 3 violation of the ADA in its complaint.  
This segues into a consideration of alternative policies to address the difficulties of the shrimp 
industry in the U.S. A petition under the ASCVM is deemed to be of questionable legality. However, 
an SG petition fits the facts and recent developments in the industry rather well. There also appears, as 
I discuss, a basis for an SPS measure. Unlike the “new protectionism” of administered protection (AD, 
SG, subsidies), an SPS measure has the potential of providing a benefit to domestic consumers in the 
form of a safer product to mitigate the effects of higher prices. An AD or SG duty imposes a pure 
welfare loss upon consumers in the importing country. Thus what we term the new new protectionism 
of SPS may be contended as the preferred way to proceed.  
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